Audio files were provided by John J. Farmer Jr., the Dean of Rutgers Law School-Newark and a senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission. Transcripts were edited from text provided by Miles L. Kara, Sr., a professional staff member of the 9/11 Commission. The call from Betty Ong was retrieved from an exhibit presented by the prosecution in United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui in United States District Court in Alexandria, Va.

 

AMERICAN 77

6.1 FAA Awareness

American Airlines Flight 77 began its takeoff roll from Dulles International Airport at 8:20.[i] The flight proceeded normally through air space controlled by the Washington Air Traffic Control Center, and was handed off to Indianapolis Center at approximately 8:40, with which it made routine radio contact.[ii]

American 77 was acknowledged by the controller, who had fourteen other planes in his sector at the time, and later instructed American 77 to climb to thirty-five thousand feet and to turn right ten degrees.[iii] At 8:51, American 77 acknowledged the clearance it was given to navigate direct to the Falmouth navigational aid.[iv] This was the last transmission from American 77.

At 8:54, the flight began a left turn towards the south without authorization. Shortly after it began the turn, the aircraft was observed descending.[v] At 8:56, as the plane continued to deviate slightly to the south from its flight plan, it was lost from radar completely; the transponder signal was gone, and the plane also disappeared as a primary radar target.[vi]

The controller tracking American 77 told the Commission he first noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and was gone.

085634 AA77 ZID attempts to contact.mp3

085850 AA77 1st contact AA dispatch.mp3

In addition, the controller reached out to controllers in other sectors at Indianapolis Center to advise them of the situation.[vii] The controllers agreed to “sterilize the air space” along the flight’s projected westerly route so that other planes would not be affected by American 77.[viii] At 8:59, Indianapolis Center began to work with controllers in other centers to protect the airspace of American 77?s projected flight path to the west.[ix]

After several minutes of searching, Indianapolis controllers once again contacted the airline:

090248 AA77 ZID 2d contact AA dispatch.mp3

091154 AA77 ZID 3d contact AA dispatch 2d WTC impact.mp3

At 9:08, the Indianapolis Center’s Operations Manager requested the Traffic Management Unit to notify Air Force Search and Rescue in Langley, Virginia, of a possible crash of American 77.[x] The Operations Manager also contacted the West Virginia State Police to advise them of the missing aircraft and ask whether they had any reports of a downed aircraft.[xi] At 9:09, Indianapolis Center reported to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident involving American 77 because of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and all radar contact.[xii] The Great Lakes Regional Operations Center passed this information along to FAA Headquarters at 9:24.[xiii]

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt their initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted the [delete: notified] Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that American 77 was lost in Indianapolis Center’s airspace, [and] that Indianapolis Center had no primary radar track and was looking for the aircraft.

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. The managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.[xiv]

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw American 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. In addition, while the Command Center learned American 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an “all points bulletin” to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, DC.[xv]

6.2 Confusion Concerning the Fate of American 77

While Indianapolis Center was busy looking for American 77 to the west, some American Airlines’ representatives believed that American 77 might have hit the World Trade Center. In an ensuing conversation with the FAA Command Center about the status of American 11, an American Airlines representative mentioned that American 77 was lost.[xvi]

091626 AA11 AA77 ATCSCC King with Halleck AAL pos 34B line 5149.mp3

Even later, after 9:30, confusion surrounding American 77 still existed within at least some levels of the FAA:

093151 FAA TACNET wrong recap line 5114.mp3

American Airlines’ notification to the FAA Command Center that American 77 was lost prompted Command Center representatives to call Indianapolis Center and seek further information on the aircraft:

091836 AA77 Summersall to ZID from ATCSCC ZID TMU.mp3

That conversation led Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost and could not be located on radar. By no later than 9:21, FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, some FAA field facilities and American Airlines had started to search for American 77 and feared it had been hijacked. Four minutes later, at 9:25, Command Center reported to FAA Headquarters all the information Command Center had learned regarding American 77.[xvii]

As previously stated, American 77 disappeared from radar at 8:56. By no later than 9:18, FAA centers in Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Washington were aware that American 77 was missing and two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center.[xviii] By 9:15, Air Force Search and Rescue was notified of the missing plane. At 9:24, Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notified the Washington Operations Center of the simultaneous loss of radio and radar contact with American 77.[xix] FAA Headquarters was aware American 77 was lost somewhere in the NAS.

By no later than 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew that two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 said “we have some planes.” Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager from Command Center specifically asked FAA Headquarters if they wanted to order a “nationwide ground stop.”[xx] While executives at FAA headquarters discussed the issuance of a national ground stop, at 9:25, Command Center exercised initiative and ordered all aircraft in the United States not to depart from any airports until further notice.[xxi] Command Center’s National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, told the Commission that he gave this order based on his belief the attacks would continue, concern that the FAA could not locate American 77 and reports that other commercial aircraft may have been hijacked. Sliney said he believed he possessed the authority to issue this order and ordered the ground stop in an attempt to mitigate any potential further damage.[xxii]

While Command Center prevented any aircraft from entering the NAS, they also continued their efforts to locate American 77. At 9:21, FAA Command Center advised a supervisor at Dulles Tracon that the FAA had lost contact with American 77 and was trying to find the aircraft. At 9:21, controllers at Dulles Tracon were advised by the FAA Command Center that a commercial aircraft was missing and instructed to look for primary targets.[xxiii] At 9:32 they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers “observed a primary target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles Airports notified the Secret Service. The identity or aircraft type was unknown at the time. This track was later confirmed to be American 77.[xxiv]

Just minutes before impact of American 77, Reagan Airport controllers vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft that Dulles Tracon had pointed out to them. The cargo aircraft attempted to follow the path of the unidentified aircraft, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower that the aircraft crashed into the Pentagon.

093607 Gofer 06 traffic in site 757 low altitude Tyson tape.mp3

093641 Gofer 06 vectored for traffic Tyson tape.mp3

093800 Gofer 06 aircraft is down tower Tyson tape.mp3

093826 Gofer 06 ac crashed into west side Pentagon Tyson tape.mp3

6.3 Military Notification and Response

By no later than 9:21, FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, some FAA field facilities and American Airlines had started to search for American 77 and feared it had been hijacked. Four minutes later, at 9:25, Command Center reported to FAA Headquarters all the information Command Center had learned regarding American 77.[xxv] The military was completely unaware the search for American 77 had begun. In fact, the military would hear once again about American 11, a plane that had already crashed, before they received any notification that American 77 was lost.

At 9:21, the military officer at Boston Center, who had been listening in on a FAA teleconference run by FAA HQ in Washington, called the NEADS ID Technician Unit:

092100 AA11 Scoggins still airborne.mp3

The mention of a “third aircraft” was not a reference to American 77. The report that American 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington DC was relayed immediately from the Mission Crew Commander to the Battle Cab. After consulting with the Battle Commander, the MCC issued the order, at 9:23, to scramble the Langley fighters in response to American 11.

092140 AA11 Still Airborne Scramble Langley Tail Chase DRM1 CH2.mp3

The scramble order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Shortly thereafter, NEADS commanders cancelled the “tail chase” using the Otis fighters since pursuing the plane from behind would leave New York airspace unprotected. Instead, the heading of the Langley fighters would be adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. When interviewed by Commission staff, the Mission Crew Commander explained that the purpose of this change in strategy was to continue to protect New York air space, and to vector the fighters from Langley to come between the southbound aircraft and the nation’s capital.[xxvi] Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30.

092427 NEADS BC update forget tail chase DRM CH2.mp3

Based on the mistaken report that American 11 was heading towards Washington DC, NEADS personnel were actively seeking more information to assist in their search for the aircraft:

092847 AA11 ID summary call to unknown.mp3

The military’s situational awareness was summarized on the NEADS floor at 9:27, immediately after the Langley scramble, as follows: “Three planes unaccounted for. American Airlines 11 may still be airborne but the flight that – United 175 to the World Trade Center. We’re not sure who the other one is.”[xxvii]

On the floor at NEADS, the ID Technicians continued to attempt to locate American 11 after the Langley fighters were airborne. At the suggestion of the Boston Center Military Officer, the ID Technicians contacted Washington Center to ask whether they had located American 11. In that conversation, NEADS was told that Washington Center knew nothing about American 11 heading south. The NEADS ID Technicians then spoke with the Operations Manager at Washington Center:

093212 AA11 AA77 ID summary ZDC loss of AA77.mp3

This discussion was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance.[xxviii] The time was 9:34. If NEADS had not placed that call to Washington Center, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that American 77 was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an aircraft closing in on Washington, an aircraft that still had not been linked with the missing American 77.

093536 AA77 Scoggins VFR 6 miles.mp3

When pressed on whether the flight was in fact a deviating aircraft, Boston Center insisted that NEADS call Washington Center, which is where the aircraft was located and could actually be seen on radar. At 9:39, just moments after the impact at the Pentagon, Washington Center disclaimed any knowledge of the plane near the White House.

093836 AA77 ID call to ZDC Boston space dont know anything.mp3

It is fair to infer, from Washington Center’s complete lack of knowledge concerning the aircraft approaching the White House, that Boston Center received the information about the aircraft from FAA headquarters. The startling information that a deviating aircraft was in close proximity to the White House prompted the Mission Crew Commander to order “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations), which entailed taking immediate control of the Langley fighters from the FAA and responsibility for the safe flight path of the Langley fighters.

093621 Langley Direct DC AFIO monster mash DRM1 CH2.mp3

The Langley fighters were ordered to proceed directly to Washington, DC. The MCC then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as previously instructed, but east over the ocean.

0939 MCC windows break push back.mp3

A combination of three factors explains why the Langley fighters initially traveled so far to the east, when their initial scramble order directed them on a heading to the north.

First, the Langley scramble order did not convey complete instructions. It instructed the fighters to “Scramble immediately time 1324… Scramble on a heading of 010 flight level 290.”

132230 Langley scramble Norfolk tower.mp3

Though the order did include a direction to fly – “010? and a flight altitude – 29,000 feet – it did not include a distance to the target, nor the target’s location, two key components that are normally included in a scramble order. Indeed, NEADS did not know the location of the mistakenly reported southbound American 11 – at the time, there was no discernable target.

Second, a “generic” flight plan assigned to the Langley fighters incorrectly led them to believe that they were being ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. In order to launch aircraft, the Langley AFB Tower was required to file an automated flight plan specifically designating the direction and distance of intended flight. Prior to 9/11, the standard – or generic – flight plan for aircraft departing Langley AFB to the east was “090 for 60? – meaning head 90 degrees (due east) for 60 miles. The generic “090 for 60? flight plan was utilized to expeditiously get aircraft airborne and out of the base’s airspace. Langley Tower personnel assumed that once fighters got airborne they would be vectored to the target of interest by either NEADS or the FAA.

Third, both the lead Langley pilot and the FAA’s Norfolk TRACON facility – which was briefly controlling the aircraft once it departed the Langley AFB airspace – assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090 for 60? was newer guidance that superceded the original scramble order instructions. In fact, shortly after the fighters got airborne, the lead Langley pilot was asked by Norfolk TRACON in what direction he wanted to head After brief discussion between the lead pilot (identified as “Quit 25?) and Norfolk TRACON, it was mutually decided that the fighters would follow the flight plan guidance.

093100 Langley what heading would like hand off Giant Killer.mp3

Put simply, the Langley pilots received flight direction guidance from both the scramble order and the Langley AFB departure flight plan, and continued on the latter heading for several minutes until a direction and geographic destination was provided.

Back at NEADS, controllers on the floor located an unknown primary radar track, but “it kind of faded” over Washington.[xxix] The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were approximately 150 miles away. [xxx]

6.4 Commission Findings and Assessment

The sequence outlined above is again noteworthy for its omission of notification times that have been widely circulated. In the official NORAD version of the events of 9/11, as presented to the Commission in May 2003, at 9:16, NORAD was notified that United 93 was a possible hijack and that notification was followed, at 9:24, by the notification that American 77 was a hijacked aircraft. According to retired Col. William Scott at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing, the FAA notified NORAD of the hijacking of United 93 at 9:16 (forty-five minutes prior to crash), and of the hijacking of American 77 at 9:24 (14 minutes prior to crash). Retired Col. Scott also indicated that the fighters at Langley Air Force Base were scrambled at 9:25 to meet the threat to Washington posed by American 77.[xxxi]

Retired General Larry Arnold amplified this information in testimony before the Commission, stating: “9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus – you have got to remember that there’s a lot of other things going on simultaneously here – was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by the FAA. ¼ We were advised [American 77] was possibly hijacked. And we had launched almost simultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airlines 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.”[xxxii]

Based on its review of the tapes, transcripts and other records obtained under subpoena, as corroborated by witness interviews at NEADS, Commission staff can state unequivocally that the timeline and testimony presented at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing were not true. The 9:24 notification time for American 77 (as well as the claimed 9:16 notification for United 93) was inaccurately derived from a handwritten log maintained by the staff working for the Mission Crew Commander (the operational commander on watch). Called the “MCC/T Log,” it was the principal log of events kept at NEADS on 9/11. At 9:24, the log records: “American Airlines #N334AA hijacked.”[xxxiii] This tail number refers not to American 77 but to American 11, the first hijacked aircraft. The subpoenaed tapes confirm that this time corresponds to the receipt of the tail number information on American 11 and to reports that American 11 was still airborne and headed towards Washington DC.[xxxiv]

Nor were the Langley fighters scrambled to meet the threat posed by American 77. The first notification to the military (NEADS) that American 77 is missing (there is no mention of it being hijacked at this point) comes at 9:34, ten minutes after the scramble has already been ordered at Langley Air Force Base.

The Langley fighters were initially scrambled not because of United 93, which had not been hijacked, nor because of American 77, which had not been reported to NEADS, but because of the mistaken report that American 11 had in fact not hit the World Trade Center, but was heading south towards Washington, DC. The fighters were ordered scrambled initially toward New York, and then vectored toward Baltimore, in an effort to intercept that mistakenly reported aircraft. The best evidence for both this false report and the resulting scramble is the subpoenaed NEADS tape, quoted above, which records the Mission Crew Commander’s immediate reaction to the report: “Okay. American Airlines is still airborne, 11, the first guy. He’s headed towards Washington, okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now, and I’m going to – I’m going to take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him.”[xxxv] Seconds after that reaction, the Mission Crew Commander ordered the scramble of the Langley fighters.

This report of American 11 heading south – the cause of the Langley scramble – is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, CONR, and NORAD, and in records extending to the highest levels of the federal government. [xxxvi] The false report was also readily acknowledged in interviews of operational personnel. Nonetheless, it is not recounted in a single public timeline issued by FAA or DOD, nor in a single public statement by government officials. Instead, the scramble at Langley is attributed to the reported hijacking of American 77, United 93, or some combination of the two.

When interviewed, Col. Marr stated that he had discounted the report that American 11 was still airborne, and insisted that the Langley scramble was in response to “everything else that was going on” that morning, and referred specifically to United 93. When informed that United 93 had not been hijacked by the time of the Langley scramble, and that American 77 was not reported missing to the NEADS air defenders until after the Langley scramble had occurred, Col. Marr was unable to point to any other complicating factors that might have led to the Langley scramble.[xxxvii]

Col. Marr’s recollection is belied by the tapes and transcripts from the morning of 9/11, the testimony of his subordinates, and the contemporaneous records from the day. The Mission Crew Commander and the ID Technicians who were on duty that morning had no doubt that the sequence revealed on the tapes, in which the Mission Crew Commander orders Langley scrambled in immediate response to the news that American 11 is still airborne, was in fact what occurred.[xxxviii]

The Commission has been unable to identify the source of the mistaken information regarding American 11. The Boston Center Military Desk person who provided the information to NEADS had been listening in on an FAA teleconference out of Washington, DC. A Senior FAA official who was working at Headquarters that morning recalls having passed the information to others, but does not know its source.[xxxix]

What is clear is that the introduction of a third hijacking into the FAA system proved to be extremely confusing, raising doubts as to the identities of the two planes that had crashed into the World Trade Center and leading, ultimately, to the false report that one of the original hijacked aircraft was still airborne, heading for Washington.

Overall, this sequence of events regarding American 77 again belies NORAD’s official timeline and the testimony given at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing. Notification of American 77 as a missing aircraft came at 9:34, after the Langley fighters had already taken off. Remarkably, the notification, when it occurred, came completely fortuitously, not as the result of existing notification protocols between FAA and NORAD. The ID Technician at NEADS called Washington Center at the prompting of the Boston FAA Military desk, in order to find further information about American 11. If NEADS had not placed that call themselves, the NEADS air defenders would have received no notification whatsoever that American 77 was missing prior to its crash. Given the facts that there had already been two suicide hijackings and that the FAA – both at the Command Center and at several regional centers – had been searching for American 77 for over thirty minutes, the failure of FAA proactively to notify NORAD of the missing aircraft seems egregious, even in hindsight.

Even when FAA controllers at Dulles Tower did pick up the primary radar track of an unknown aircraft southwest of Washington, no one at FAA thought ask for military assistance. Once again, the NEADS air defenders received word of the unknown target from Boston Center’s Military position, which happened to overhear the discussion of the sighting on a teleconference originating from Washington.

ANOTHER MISTAKEN REPORT: DELTA FLIGHT 1989

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989; a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.

093927 D1989 ID Scoggins 3d ac is D1989.mp3

Because Delta 1989 had not turned off its transponder, NEADS never lost track of the aircraft as it moved west, reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.[i] NEADS even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept Delta 1989.

After receiving the initial report from Boston Center, the NEADS ID Technicians called several FAA facilities to share the information they had learned about Delta 1989:

094232 D1989 ID alert call to ZID.mp3

094452 D1989 ID alert call to ZOB .mp3

The ID Technician advised that all of their fighters had been scrambled on the New York and Washington events, and that NEADS was looking for other fighters to scramble to intercept the Delta flight.[ii]

At approximately 9:45, while one NEADS ID technician was confirming 1989 as a hijack to Cleveland Center, another ID Technician received a call from the Boston Center Military position advising that Delta 1989 might not be a hijack after all:

094241 AA11 D1989 ID Scoggins extended discussion ACARS (2).mp3

NEADS informed Boston Center that they were tracking Delta 1989 as it passed over Toledo. The NEADS air defenders continued to track Delta 1989 for the next several minutes, watching its every move until it landed in Cleveland.

The Mission Crew Commander, with his full complement of alert aircraft capping New York City and heading for Washington, decided to look for non-NORAD aircraft from the midwest to intercept the Delta flight. NEADS personnel contacted Toledo and Selfridge Air Force Bases and diverted fighters from training missions to intercept Delta 1989.[iii]

Just before 10:00, the Mission Crew Commander made the following report:

095934 NEADS MCC what are we going to do DRM1 CH2.mp3

The Mission Crew Commander was advised, at approximately 10:00, that there was no authority to shoot the plane down; the rules of engagement only authorized NEADS to direct fighter aircraft to intercept, identify, and escort other aircraft.[iv]

The issue was moot with respect to Delta 1989, for at 9:58, the ID Technicians announced to the floor that “1989 is no hijack, landing in Cleveland as a precautionary measure.” The ID Technician called Boston Center at 9:59 and informed its military position:

0959 page 37 NEADS to ZBW D1989 not hijack.mp3

At 10:03, the ID Technicians called Indianapolis Center and informed them that the Delta 1989 flight was not a hijack, but that they had four fighters scrambled on it “just to be sure” (fighters other than Otis and Langley). The Mission Crew Commander had scrambled fighters from Otis Air Force Base to respond to the situation in New York, and fighters from Langley to respond first to the reports of American 11 heading south, and then to establish a Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC. These scrambles exhausted NEADS’ complement of alert fighters. To intercept Delta 1989, the Mission Crew Commander scrambled fighters from Air National Guard units at Toledo, Ohio and Selfridge, Michigan.

1003 ID techs notify ZID about D1989.mp3

At that moment, United 93, an aircraft about which the NEADS air defenders had heard absolutely nothing, crashed in Pennsylvania.[v]

UNITED 93

8.1 FAA Awareness

United Airlines Flight 93 began its takeoff roll from Newark International Airport at 8:42, some forty minutes late, and checked in with air traffic control at 8:43: “United 93 fourteen hundred [feet] for twenty-five hundred.”[i] All communications with Newark Tower, New York Tracon, and New York Air Route Traffic Center were normal; after reporting experiencing some “light chop” at 35,000 feet, the flight was handed off to Cleveland Center at 9:23.[ii] Several seconds later, United 93 established radio contact with Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center: “Morning Cleveland, United Ninety-three with you at, three-five-oh (35,000 feet), intermittent light chop.[iii] The controller did not respond to this initial transmission as he had sixteen flights under his control, and was issuing new routes to several aircraft based upon the decisions in New York and Boston to ground-stop all aircraft.[iv]

United 93 again radioed Cleveland Center at 9:25, checking in at 35,000 feet. The controller replied, “United ninety-three, Cleveland, roger.”[v] The controller then engaged in conversation with several aircraft about the evolving situation in New York City and the prospects for flights to be allowed to land in Philadelphia; while the controller was extremely discreet, it was clear what he was talking about. The time was 9:26.

092556 Midex 150 Philiadelphia.mp3

The controller, who was moving planes away from each other as the traffic built in his sector from the ground stop in New York and Boston, warned several planes, including United 93: “United 93 that traffic for you is one o’clock twelve miles eastbound three seven zero.” The aircraft acknowledged: “Negative contact we’re looking United Ninety-three.”[vi] Then, at 9:28, the controller and the pilots of several other flights heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin …”[vii] The controller responded: “Somebody call Cleveland?”[viii] This was followed, at 9:29, by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming and someone yelling “Get out of here, get out of here,” again from an unknown source.[ix] The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.

0928 UA93 last normal and first trouble.mp3

The controller responsible for United 93 attempted to contact the aircraft. There was no reply. The controller attempted again to raise United 93: “United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet).”[x] There was no reply. The controller tried to raise United 93 several more times, with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to determine the source of the noise.

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: “keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.”[xi]

0932 UA93 bomb on board.mp3

Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to forty thousand seven hundred feet. He moved several aircraft out of the way of the non-responsive United 93, including Delta 1989.

0934 UA93 moves other traffic including D1989.mp3

Pilots radioed in confirmation that they had heard that there was a bomb on board.[xii] The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked, at 9:36, whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response.

As the flight continued to climb and fly erratically, the controller moved decisively to clear the other flights in his sector from United 93?s erratic flight path.

Then, at 9:39, another radio transmission came over the frequency from United 93:

0939 UA93 bomb on board and controller followup.mp3

When the flight did not respond, pilots on other flights confirmed that they had heard the transmission. The controller continued to move traffic out of the flight path of United 93 until, at 9:41, the center lost United 93?s transponder signal:

094106 UA93 lost transponder controller talks to two airplanes.mp3

The controller located the aircraft on primary radar, and matched his reading with visual sightings from other aircraft to follow the flight as it turned east and, ultimately, south.[xiii]

While controllers at FAA’s Cleveland Center tracked the path of United 93 as it headed east, it did not take long for Cleveland Center’s managers to notify all levels of upper management of the grave situation developing on board United 93.

At approximately 9:39, Cleveland Center notified the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center in Chicago of the screams and statements relating to having a “bomb on board” that it believed were coming from United 93. Even before the region received notice of United 93, senior managers at both FAA headquarters and Command Center were notified of the report that United 93 had a bomb on board. Cleveland Center’s notice to upper management was prompted by Command Center’s request for information concerning suspicious aircraft. At approximately 9:18, the Deputy Director of Air Traffic at FAA headquarters established an open line of communication with a manager from the Command Center at Herndon.[xiv] At approximately 9:25, FAA headquarters instructed Command Center to “get an awareness up to all the traffic management coordinators or the traffic management units to report any unusual circumstances direct to the Command Center of loss of identification, or any radio, uh, any unusual radio transmissions.”[xv] At approximately 9:31, the National Traffic Management Officer on duty at Command Center executed the request from FAA Headquarters:

0931 CC inventory order.mp3

Approximately one minute after this request for information was sent to the FAA field facilities, Cleveland Center provided Command Center with the following urgent report:

0934 UA93 ZOB reports bomb on board.mp3/a>

In less than two minutes, at 9:34, Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA Headquarters:

0934 UA93 CC report to HQ FAA.mp3

At approximately 9:36, Cleveland Center advised Command Center that they were still tracking United 93 and inquired specifically whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept United 93. Cleveland Center even told Command Center they were prepared to contact a nearby military base to request fighter aircraft assistance. Command Center told Cleveland Center that FAA personnel above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to request military assistance.[xvi]

093601 ZOB call re want to scramble military here.mp3

Indeed, from 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided several updates to the Deputy Administrator and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 approached the Washington, DC area. Specifically, at 9:41, Command Center notified headquarters that United 93 had reversed course from its intended flight path and was descending:

0941 UA93 CC to HQ FAA over Akron.mp3

At 9:42, Command Center learned through a television news report that a plane had struck the Pentagon.[xvii] FAA headquarters also knew the Pentagon had been attacked by an aircraft.[xviii] Shortly after Command Center heard about the crash at the Pentagon, Command Center’s National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport.[xix] At the time the order was given, there were approximately 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft in the skies over the United States. All aircraft landed without incident. This was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill.

While Command Center employees informed FAA field facilities of the order to land all aircraft, one of the Command Center managers continued to give FAA headquarters several updates on the progress and location of United 93. In fact, at 9:46, 17 minutes before impact, Command Center gave this update on United 93 to FAA headquarters:

0946 UA93 CC to HQ FAA 29 minutes out.mp3

At 9:48, FAA Command Center told headquarters United 93 was on a course for Washington, DC:

0948 UA93 CC to FAA HQ 23 minutes out.mp3

At 9:49, Command Center suggest[ed] that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

0949 Pulling Jeff away.mp3

[The timing of this conversation is consistent with the FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and her staff's having joined the Air Threat Conference Call run by Richard Clarke from the White House Situation Room. There is no evidence that the report passed to FAA Headquarters from the Command Center reached the military in a timely fashion.]

At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft.[xx] Then, at 9:56, Command Center informed headquarters they lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.[xxi] Within seconds, Command Center located United 93 and informed headquarters:

0958 UA93 20 miles Johnstown.mp3

At 10:00, Command Center advised headquarters that “United ninety three was spotted by a VFR at eight thousand feet, eleven, eleven miles south of Indianhead, just north of Cumberland, Maryland.[xxii] At 10:01, just two minutes before United 93 crashed, Command Center provided FAA headquarters with the following update:

1000 UA93 Rocking wings.mp3

At 10:08, five minutes after United 93 crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters:

100744 UA93 Report of black smoke AA77 Q re police report.mp3

At 10:17, Command Center advised headquarters of its belief that United 93 had “crashed fifteen miles south of Johnstown, Pennsylvania”.[xxiii]

No one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. In fact, the executive level managers at FAA headquarters did not forward the information they received from Command Center regarding United 93 to the military.

8.2 Military Notification and Response

NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07. This call was the first notification the military – at any level – received about United 93. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last know latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.

100701 UA93 ZOB to NEADS bomb on board.mp3

When the information that United 93 had turned off its transponder and had a potential bomb on board reached the mission crew commander, he was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington and what their orders were with respect to potential targets. While NEADS searched for the radar track on United 93, the Mission Crew Commander and his Weapons Director engaged in the following conversation shortly after 10:10 concerning the rules of engagement:

100901 UA93 negative clearance to shoot.mp3

As the news of a bomb on board United 93 spread throughout the floor, the NEADS air defenders searched for the primary radar target and the Mission Crew Commander tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. At approximately 10:11, the commander got on the phone with an Air National Guard Unit in Syracuse:

101145 NEADS discussion with Syracuse Cdr.mp3

NEADS Identification Technicians called Washington Center to provide a “heads up” to them about United 93, but Washington Center provided NEADS with startling new information on the flight:

101418 ZDC to NEADS UA93 is down.mp3

The time was 10:15 and the call was NEADS’ first notice that United 93 had crashed. The actual time of the crash was 10:03:11.

By 10:15, the NEADS air defenders knew that two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center, a third had crashed into the Pentagon, Delta 1989 had landed safely in Cleveland and was not a hijack, and United 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania.

The minutes after 10:15 were spent on the floor at NEADS attempting to mobilize other fighters from the eastern seaboard, and anticipating the arrival of Air Force Once in the Washington area. The Mission Crew Commander was notified at 10:25 that “Air Force One is airborne out of Florida heading to Washington. We’ve got those four F-15s coming out of Langley. They’re done rolling. Two of them will be diverted to escort at the appropriate time.”

Then, at 10:32, the MCC Technician read information that had just come across the Chat Log from CONR in Florida:

103200 chat log shoot-down words.mp3

The NEADS air defenders have expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of this order in interviews with Commission staff.[xxvi] Indeed, Colonel Marr indicated to staff that he actually believes he withheld the order from the floor for several minutes because he was unsure of its ramifications,[xxvii] while both the Mission Crew Commander and the Weapons Director indicated that they withheld the order from the pilots flying Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC and New York City because they were unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with such an order.[xxviii] The Weapons Director [struggled with repeated requests from the pilots and controllers for clarification of the rules of engagement, but ultimately responded:]

1051 Currently at peace.mp3

1053 New direction coming down.mp3

1053 Boston track of interest.mp3

1102 Controller asks for kill direction.mp3

1103 Cleared to engage.mp3

The shoot-down [authorization] order was the first official “rules of engagement” (ROE) of the morning to come down through the chain of command at DOD to NEADS. At virtually the same time, the Department of Defense elevated its alert status to DEFCON 3. This alert posture was suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al Qaeda’s attack. Nonetheless, the shift to an elevated alert status signified the reassertion of authority by the national command structure. The air defense of the United States – subsequently called operation “Noble Eagle” – had at last begun.

8.3 Commission Findings and Assessment

The operational facts of the military response to United 93, as reflected in the tapes and transcripts as corroborated by contemporaneous logs and witness interviews, contrast sharply with the official explanations of that response. The military did not receive notice that United 93 was a hijacking at 9:16, as reported to the Commission, in May 2003, by NORAD; that notice came at 10:07.

At 9:16, the MCC/T Log records: “United tail #N612UA/75 S0B/”[xxix] This tail number corresponds not with United 93 but with United 175, which had crashed into the World Trade Center. A corresponding conversation on the subpoenaed tapes confirms that at 9:16 NEADS was receiving confirmation of the tail number of the United 175 flight.[xxx]

Furthermore, at 9:16, the plane had not yet even been hijacked. In fact, the sounds of the initial struggle on board United 93 that resulted in its hijacking are not audible on the air traffic radio frequency in Cleveland Center until 9:28. As late as 9:25, moreover, according to FAA controller transcripts, the pilot of United 93 radioed in: “United ninety-three checking three-five-oh (35,000 feet).”

The “ground truth” revealed by the tapes, as corroborated by Commission staff, also belies the official version of the response to United 93 that is built on the early notification time. “Air War Over America,” for instance, the 1^st Air Force’s official history of 9/11, offers the following accounts by two of the key NORAD participants:

(Colonel Robert Marr, NEADS Commander): “With all available alert fighters in the air, Marr and his crew were still faced with United Flight 93. The plane was headed west, so controllers began looking for any other fighter jets that might be nearby. `We don’t have fighters that way and we think he’s headed toward Detroit or Chicago,’ Marr says. `I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base (Mich.) has F-16s in the air. We contacted them so they could head 93 off at the pass. The idea is to get in there, close in on him and convince him to turn… As United Airlines Flight 93 was going out, we received the clearance to kill if need be. In fact, General Arnold’s words almost verbatim were: `We will take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.’” [xxxi]

(General Larry Arnold, CONR Commander): “…we watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC. By now the Pentagon has been hit and we have aircraft on orbit… They are now orbiting over Washington, DC, and have been for a while. As United 93 headed toward DC, the desire is to move the fighters toward that aircraft.”[xxxii]

The record demonstrates, however, that no-one at any level in NORAD (or DOD) ever “watched the 93 track” start to turn south toward DC. The only track that NEADS watched was the Delta 1989 track, which turned toward Cleveland. In fact, NORAD never saw United 93 at all. The Selfridge fighters were contacted not regarding United 93, but Delta 1989. Most important, NORAD certainly never “received the clearance to kill if need be” on United 93; indeed, as determined by Commission staff, as late as 10:10 the ROE orders given by the NEADS Mission Crew Commander were “negative clearance to shoot” regarding targets over Washington, DC.[xxxiii]

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